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Summary
1. Biodiversity offsetting has quickly gained political support all around the world. Avoided
loss (averted risk) offsetting means compensation for ecological damage via averted loss of
anticipated impacts through the removal of threatening processes in compensation areas.
2. Leakage means the phenomenon of environmentally damaging activity relocating else-
where after being stopped locally by avoided loss offsetting. Indirect leakage means that
locally avoided losses displace to other administrative areas or spread around diffusely via
market effects.
3. Synthesis and applications. Indirect leakage can lead to high net biodiversity loss. It is diffi-
cult to measure or prevent, raising doubts about the value of avoided loss offsetting. Market
demand for commodities is on the rise, following increasing human population size and per
capita consumption, implying that indirect leakage will be a rule rather than an exception.
Leakage should be accounted for when determining offset multipliers (ratios) even if multipli-
ers become extremely high.
Key-words: activity shifting, averted risk, biodiversity offsetting, displacement, habitat bank,
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Introduction
Biodiversity offsetting is used to compensate for ecologi-
cal and environmental damage caused by development
activities (BBOP 2013; Bull et al. 2013; Gardner et al.
2013). It is a conservation tool that may complement tra-
ditional conservation measures and is usually only applied
as part of a mitigation hierarchy after impact avoidance
has first been attempted (Kiesecker et al. 2009; Gardner
et al. 2013). While ground implementation and validation
lag behind, policy (governmental and corporate), science,
analysis and discussion around offsetting have expanded
very rapidly during the past decade (Kiesecker et al. 2009;
Gardner et al. 2013; Hayes 2014). For example, in 2012
France adopted a national offset policy with the objective
of no net loss (NNL) of biodiversity, and preferably a net
gain for currently threatened biodiversity and ecosystems
(Quetier, Regnery & Levrel 2014). There are two main
classes of offset activities, habitat restoration offsets and
avoided loss (also known as ‘averted risk’) offsets, of
which the latter is the focus of the present article.
In contrast to restoration offsets, which compensate for
ecological damage via active restoration of injured habitat
or flora and fauna, avoided loss offsets provide compensa-
tion via averted loss of anticipated impacts through the
removal of threatening processes in the compensation areas
(Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007; Maron et al. 2010, 2012).
Avoided deforestation is one example of avoided loss off-
sets. Avoided loss offsets are criticized because the gains
generated are calculated compared to a baseline of ongoing
decline and therefore never result in a net gain in the eco-
logical condition of the landscape (International Union for
Conservation of Nature: IUCN 2014). Estimates of gains
via avoided loss must necessarily rely on uncertain estima-
tion of the probability of biodiversity loss at the offset site
in the absence of additional protection, but this probability
is not easy to estimate (Maron et al. 2010; Bull et al. 2014).
Furthermore, it has been found that offset policies fre-
quently permit the ‘protection’ of a site as an avoided loss
offset, even if loss of the offset site itself would have had to
be offset (Maron et al. 2012). Sites might also be proposed
as offsets even if they are unlikely ever to be developed.
Yet another problem, and the one discussed in this arti-
cle, is leakage (also known as displacement or activity
shifting). In the present context leakage means the phe-
nomenon that environmentally damaging activity stopped
by avoided loss offsetting (in the offset site) is not really
stopped but relocates elsewhere, either fully or partially.*Correspondence author. E-mail: atte.moilanen@helsinki.fi
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Leakage of harmful activities is a well-known problem in
protected area design (Ewers & Rodrigues 1998; van Oos-
terzee, Blignaut & Bradshaw 2012). A recent study about
offsetting in the mining industry found that leakage had
not been prevented even within the impacted regions
(Virah-Sawmy, Ebeling & Taplin 2014).
Leakage has been noted as a problem in carbon offset-
ting and projects for Reducing Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Forest Degradation (REDD). In well-designed
REDD projects, leakage risks have to be systematically
evaluated using a causal model framework. The expected
amount of leakage is then conservatively deducted from
project benefits (Olander & Ebeling 2011). Methodologies
to do so have, for instance, been approved for carbon
accounting under the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS
2013). Nevertheless, there is a major difference between
accounting for leakage of a single-dimensional and rela-
tively easily measurable physical quantity (carbon) com-
pared to a high-dimensional and poorly measurable entity
(biodiversity). Even in the case of carbon, the cost and
complexity of accounting for leakage and the difficulty of
finding direct causal links result in major impediments
to project implementation (van Oosterzee, Blignaut &
Bradshaw 2012). It has also been observed that carbon off-
setting could lead to leakage of threats that primarily
impact biodiversity and ecosystem services, not necessarily
carbon. For example, in Indonesia the highest carbon for-
ests on peat are known to support lower species diversity
and concentrations of threatened species than lowland min-
eral soil forests (Harrison & Paoli (2012). The question of
‘what leaks’ is related to the contrast between strong sus-
tainability and weak sustainability (flexibility) in biodiver-
sity offsetting: should compensation be like-for-like or
should flexibility be allowed (Moilanen et al. 2009)?
Despite such concerns, avoided loss offsetting is clearly
recognized as a tool in present offset policies. For exam-
ple, a recent technical paper about offsets compiled by an
IUCN task force says: ‘Some, therefore, believe that
averted risk offsets should only ever represent part of a
biodiversity offset programme’ (IUCN (International
Union for Conservation of Nature) 2014, p. 25). This
seems to imply that according to many avoided loss off-
sets are fine. The same document also specifies: ‘Further,
claiming that a site would have been destroyed under the
status quo may be inconsistent with an overarching policy
where impacts can only proceed if they achieve No Net
Loss or Net Gain. This is a key critique of averted risk
offsets generally. There is, however, a lack of agreement
on whether and in what circumstances averting risk is
additional’ (IUCN (International Union for Conservation
of Nature) 2014, p. 25).
With numerous governments, organizations and large
multinational corporations involved, the international
cross-sectoral collaboration BBOP (Business and Biodi-
versity Offsetting Programme) is perhaps the most influen-
tial consortium engaging in offsetting activities globally.
Looking into the BBOP Standard on Biodiversity Offsets
and its Guidance Notes, we find that they consistently
repeat avoided (averted) loss as the second major
approach of offsetting (BBOP 2012). Concern about leak-
age is highly visible: for example the ‘Guidance Notes to
the Standard on Biodiversity Offsets’ document mentions
leakage 47 times and clearly states that the likelihood of
leakage should be evaluated and accounted for. While this
attitude is commendable, leakage is seen in a particular
way in these documents. It is seen as highly likely when:
(i) ‘There is intense pressure to access forests for subsis-
tence hunting’, (ii) ‘Extremely valuable wildlife or timber
resources in the area will be much less available following
offset implementation’, (iii) ‘There is a high local popula-
tion density and dependence on biodiversity for liveli-
hoods’, or (iv) ‘The offset site and areas like it provide a
significant source of income to local communities or com-
mercial enterprises’ (BBOP (Business and Biodiversity
Offsets Programme) 2012, p. 65). Leakage is thus seen as
a local or regional issue, or perhaps as an activity imple-
mented by one company or within one jurisdiction, which
is in contrast to carbon offsetting, in which leakage is pri-
marily seen as a long-distance phenomenon (Olander &
Ebeling 2011). This brings us to our present point: indi-
rect (and possibly non-local) leakage is an almost fatal
problem for avoided loss offsetting.
Avoided loss offsetting and indirect leakage
A SCHEMATIC ILLUSTRATION OF INDIRECT LEAKAGE
The mechanism by which leakage reduces the value of off-
setting is that the damage supposedly saved by the offset-
ting action shifts elsewhere, thus leading to reduced net
benefits. If half of the damage ‘saved’ by an offsetting
action leaks, then the compensation is 50% less than
expected.
Figure 1 illustrates leakage in the context of avoided loss
offsetting. First, area A1 will be lost due to development or
contamination. Another area (A2) with the same owner
could be proposed as compensation via avoided loss. The
offset area also could be purchased from another owner
(A3), as in habitat banking. Direct leakage would occur if
the owner of the offset area relocates activities elsewhere
inside the region (A4 in Fig. 1). Direct leakage is clearly
recognized by the BBOP core documents (BBOP (Business
and Biodiversity Offsets Programme) 2012), but indirect
leakage is much more difficult to observe and prevent. For
example, owner A could be a complex multinational corpo-
ration; it could compensate the loss of opportunities in A2
by increasing resource extraction in A5 in another region/
administration, effectively reducing the effectiveness of off-
setting. Likewise, owner B could relocate activities from A3
to A6. Leakage becomes even less transparent if reduced
opportunities in region 1 cause increased market demand in
another region/administration, thereby leading to increased
resource extraction in area A7 owned by a completely unre-
lated owner C. The last type of leakage is an example of
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market leakage and is also called ‘secondary leakage’ while
the others represent ‘primary leakage’ mediated by the
baseline agents A and B (Aukland, Costa & Brown 2003).
It raises difficult philosophical and operational questions
about the implementation of offsetting if leakage is very
hard to evaluate or if it is mediated by other parties than
those directly involved with damage and compensation.
We have in the example above assumed for simplicity
that there would in the absence of offsetting be complete
loss of ecological services or biodiversity in the compensa-
tion areas. If only partial loss is expected, compensation
gains become smaller per unit area, meaning that offset
areas need to be proportionally larger to achieve NNL.
NNL fails if ‘baseline’ losses prevented by compensation
have been overestimated to begin with (Bull et al. 2014;
Gordon et al. 2015).
It is possible to estimate the long-term expected habitat
loss when similar offsetting operations occur repeatedly. If
complete loss is expected in compensation areas, each dam-
aged area would be adequately (=NNL) compensated by
avoided loss in an equal-size compensation area. In the
absence of leakage, iteration of this process leads to loss of
half of the habitats in the landscape, while the other half
becomes protected to compensate for the losses. With com-
plete leakage, two areas are lost for every area designated
as offset, implying the loss of two-thirds of the landscape in
the long run. Thus, taking a broader perspective, avoided
loss offsetting does not result in NNL. At best it only
results in limited loss, with the equilibrium state of the land-
scape depending on the ratio of impacted to compensation
areas. Analysis could be applied to avoided loss offsetting
to determine the landscape-level loss truly expected.
LEAKAGE-CORRECTED OFFSET MULTIPL IERS
Offset multipliers (or ratios) are operative measures for the
amount (area) of offsetting action required in order to
achieve NNL (Moilanen et al. 2009). Under the very sim-
plified assumption that conservation value is proportional
to area, a multiplier can be defined as the ratio of offset
area and the impacted area. Multipliers should usually be
much larger than one because of baseline considerations,
incomplete restoration effectiveness, relative habitat quality
between development and offset site, durations of offsetting
actions and the impact, time discounting of losses and/or
benefits, and various associated uncertainties (Moilanen
et al. 2009; Bull et al. 2014; Laitila, Moilanen & Pouzols
2014).
The presence of leakage should greatly increase any off-
set multiplier. First, assume that per-area-unit gain from
offsetting equals per-area-unit loss from damage. Then,
ignoring leakage, NNL is achieved when the size of the
offset area AO is equal to the size of the damaged area
AD, and the multiplier then becomes M = AO/AD = 1.
Next, let L denote the proportion of averted loss that
leaks elsewhere. Then, the amount of damage truly
avoided is (1  L) times AO, multiplied by the multiplier
M. For NNL to hold, compensation must equal damage,
implying that M(1  L) AO = AD. Given that the sizes of
areas were equal, AO = AD, it follows M = AD/[(1  L)
AO] = AO/[(1  L) AO] = 1/(1  L). More generally, even
if the per-area-unit gain and loss are not equal, it is easy
to check that any multiplier M should be multiplied by
1/(1  L) to account for leakage, which is a factor inde-
pendent from other considerations. Consequently, multi-
pliers can become very large: with 90% leakage, the
multiplier due to leakage alone would be 10.
FACTORS INFLUENCING DIRECT AND INDIRECT
LEAKAGE
From Table 1, it is apparent that (direct) leakage that
happens locally is rather different from indirect leakage,
which possibly impacts different features than those sub-
ject to offsetting, and is possibly mediated by actors not
legally involved in the original damage or offsetting.
WHEN COULD AVOIDED LOSS OFFSETS WORK?
Setting aside problems discussed above, cases where
avoided loss offsets would appear most useful include the
following:
Region 1
Region 2
diﬀerent country/administraƟon
Area A1 
(damage)
owner A Area A3
(oﬀset)
owner B
Area A2
(oﬀset)
owner A
Area A5
(IL)
owner A
Area A6
(IL)
owner B
Area A7
(IL)
owner C
Area A4
(DL)
owner B
Direct
leakage
Indirect
leakage
Indirect
leakage
Indirect leakage 
mediated by 
market forces
Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of direct (DL) and indirect (IL) leakage. We assume two regions (geographic areas) with different adminis-
trations (governments, permitting agencies). In this example, damaging land-use activity and offsetting occur in region 1. In contrast,
leakage may relocate impacts within the region or move them to a different administration (region 2). Market forces may mediate indi-
rect leakage via increased demand in areas that are not subject to damage or offsetting. Different owners are indicated for areas.
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1. If in the absence of offsetting there will be only damage
but no compensation, then perhaps avoided loss offsets are
better than nothing, even if damages are incompletely com-
pensated for. This comes with the price of giving legitimacy
to development and a potentially flawed process.
2.Offsetting might be fair if the calculation of NNL
includes information about the multidimensional charac-
ter of biodiversity, time delays, leakage and uncertainties,
although this may lead to offset multipliers that seem
undesirably high from the perspective of developers.
3.Avoided loss offsetting is a possibility when trading up
(Gardner et al. 2013; Quetier, Regnery & Levrel 2014),
when the lost habitat is of clearly lower ecological impor-
tance than the areas saved. While we have not reviewed
this, we expect that in many countries offsetting is not
required for low or medium quality areas, perhaps mak-
ing opportunities for trading up rare.
4. Following the previous point, offsetting might work
within one country if all activities that influence major
habitat types are subject to offsetting, like in the present
French policy (Gardner et al. 2013; Quetier, Regnery &
Levrel 2014). Nevertheless, this does not remove opera-
tional problems nor does it prevent indirect leakage to
other countries.
5.Avoided loss offsetting would seem fine if the price
paid includes a permanent regional reduction in utiliza-
tion of natural resources, leading to long-term improve-
ment in the ecological condition of the area. Then again,
there will be scarce guarantees against indirect leakage.
Discussion and conclusions
The population of the world and per capita consumption
are growing (Lee 2011). This implies that aggregate market
demand for commodities is increasing, increasing pressure
for the utilization of natural resources, and increasing the
likelihood of leakage of environmental damage. Against
this backdrop, our expectation is that indirect leakage
occurs commonly in avoided loss offset agreements. Con-
cern about indirect leakage comes on top of other serious
concerns expressed recently about the response of the soci-
ety to offsetting. Gordon et al. (2015) found that offsetting
both via restoration and avoided loss can result in incen-
tives for entrenching or exacerbating baseline biodiversity
declines, winding back of non-offset conservation actions,
crowding out of conservation volunteerism, and false public
confidence in environmental outcomes due to marketing
claims that offset actions result in gains. It is a concern if
promotion of offsets allows for the higher steps in the miti-
gation hierarchy to be ignored. Nevertheless, offsetting can
provide a better outcome locally compared to doing noth-
ing, and, assuming flexibility is allowed, it could potentially
provide funds for other appropriate conservation interven-
tions. Adopting integrated landscape-level approaches to
land-use planning, including conservation and offsetting,
may reduce the risks of avoided loss offsetting (Hayes
2014). Furthermore, spatial prioritization techniques may
be utilized to target offsets in an ecologically well-informed
manner (Moilanen 2013).
Table 1. Differences between direct and indirect leakage from the perspective of biodiversity offsetting
Influencing factor
Type of leakage
Direct Indirect
Type of resource extracted: renewable
(often biotic) vs. non-renewable
(often abiotic, or slowly renewing biotic)
Can possibly be controlled for.
Permanent reduction in resource
use elsewhere in the region could
credibly offset losses
Difficult to control. A greater problem
with non-renewable resources if
indirect leakage is mediated by shifts
in global market demand
Organization doing the extraction:
local vs. multinational
No major difference locally.
Large multinational companies
may be better positioned to
adopt offsetting policies that
require expertise and resources
in implementation
Higher risk with multinational
companies, which may implement
activity shifting to compensate for
opportunities lost due to offsetting.
Potential for indirect leakage
mediated by market effects will
also exist
Quality ratio of offset site
to damaged area: high vs. low
Can be controlled so that trading like-for-like
or trading up is achieved acceptably
Realistic potential for trading down.
For example, if offsetting is done
in developing countries of relatively
low biodiversity importance,
economic activity can shift to
tropical regions with higher
biodiversity
In kind vs. out of kind leakage Activity shifting away from the offset site could
cause impacts to features other than those subject
to damage and offsetting. Locally, there may
be some possibility to control this
When one commodity becomes sparse
it may be replaced with another,
causing losses of a different kind.
Multinational companies can shift
to other types of activities if one
becomes limited by offsetting
commitments
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Avoided loss offsetting is partially at odds with the
international targets of the United Nations Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD; IUCN/UNEP (2010). This
is because the CBD 2010 target #11 already implies sig-
nificant additional protection of habitats by expanding
terrestrial protected areas to 17% of land cover. Thereby
many of the ‘at-risk’ areas used as compensation in
avoided loss offsetting should actually first become pro-
tected following the CBD, meaning that they should not
be used for offsetting at all: offsets should always be
additional to other conservation action. Secondly, the
CBD target #15 says that 15% of the world’s degraded
ecosystems should be restored, which implies that target
#11 should not be made void by corresponding habitat
loss elsewhere. As with protected area network expan-
sion, offsetting implemented via habitat restoration
should similarly come on top of what should be imple-
mented due to the CBD already. We propose this con-
ceptual argument while being fully aware that the
implementation of the CBD resolutions is not really on
track to achieving the targets set in 2010 (Tittensor et al.
2014).
We have argued that indirect leakage at a spatial scale
spanning countries and jurisdictions is a possibly fatal
concern with biodiversity offsetting using avoided loss for
compensation. Despite avoided loss offsets being quoted
as the other major category of offset operations by major
organizations concerned with offsetting (BBOP, IUCN,
etc.), the present arguments show that: (i) avoided loss
offsetting can lead to high biodiversity loss (one-half–
two-thirds of the ecological values across administrations),
(ii) this loss can be partially alleviated with large multipli-
ers imposed on offsetting, using multipliers in the order of
1/(1-leakage), (iii) there will be great uncertainty about
how much leakage is mediated by market demand and
multinational companies in any specific case, (iv) indirect
leakage could impact biodiversity features not subject to
original damage or offsetting (negative externalities; out
of kind leakage), (v) the worst combination is avoided
loss offsetting implemented by temporary conservation
contracts, which leaves no part of the environment safe in
the long run, and (vi) unless careful application of
avoided loss can be ensured, and leakage can be reliably
estimated, avoided loss offsetting should best be avoided.
In conclusion, if not carefully applied, avoided loss offset-
ting much resembles a deceptive marketing ploy. It may
perhaps work temporarily for individual projects within
one locality, but taking a global long-term view, it could
easily lead to compensation gains that fail NNL much
worse than expected.
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